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Abstract
We examine the interactions between different institutional arrange-
ments in a general equilibrium model of a modernizing economy. There is
a modern sector, where productivity is high but information asymmetries
are large, and a traditional sector where productivity is low but informa-
tion asymmetries are low. Consequently, agency costs in the modern sector
make consumption lending difficult, while such loans are readily obtainable
in the traditional sector. The resulting trade-off between credit availability
and productivity implies that not everyone will move to the modern sector.
In fact, the laissez-faire level of modernization may fail to maximize net
social surplus.
This situation may also hold in the long run: in a dynamic version of
the model, a "trickle-down" effect links the process of modernization with
reduction in modern sector agency costs. This effect may be too weak
and the economy may get stuck in a trap and never fully modernize. The
two-sector structure also yields a natural theoretical testing ground for the
Kuznets inverted-U hypothesis: we show that even within the "sectoral
shifting" class of models, this phenomenon is not robust to small changes
in model specification.
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1. Introduction
The process by which an underdeveloped economy transforms itself into a devel-
oped one involves more than just a rise in living standards. It usually brings about
substantial changes in the way people conduct their entire lives — their social re-
lations, their levels of urbanization and commercialization, even their political
roles. In this paper we look at the relation between this process of institutional
change — often called modernization — and the process of economic change that
seems to go with it. .
We take the view that these processes are not independent; nor is moderniza-
tion merely a product of economic growth. Rather they are autonomous processes
which interact with each other and can, under different circumstances, either pro-
mote or retard each other. While this position is not entirely uncontroversial,
there is now a sufficiently impressive body of evidence in support of this point of
view to warrant its exploration in a formal model.1
We study an economy consisting of two sectors which are distinguished in two
ways: technological and institutional. One sector has a more modern technology,
and is therefore more productive, but people live and work in different places and
are essentially anonymous — the information they have about each other is poor.
By contrast, the other sector is more traditional: the technology is less productive,
but because people live and work together, they know a lot about what is going
on in the lives of their neighbors.
This difference in the degree of information asymmetry is important because
people in this economy sometimes need consumption loans. Loan transactions
are subject to default by the borrower and as a result, lenders are reluctant to
lend to those who cannot provide a significant amount of collateral. The superior
information in the traditional sector allows lenders to monitor borrowers better;
as a result, each individual borrower gets as good or better access to credit than
he would be able to get in the modern sector. This sets up a trade-off between
the superior access to credit in the traditional sector and the higher productivity
in the modern sector. It follows that some of the population will fail to migrate
to the more productive sector, even long after the opportunity to move becomes
available.
The first result in the paper identifies those who have the most incentive
to leave the traditional sector and work in the modern sector. They are the
wealthiest, the most productive and possibly, the poorest and least productive.
The wealthy leave because they can finance the consumption on their own and do
1
 Among economic historians this line of argument has been developed by North and Thomas
[19], Mokyr [18] and Rosenberg and Birdzell [21], among others. See also Baumol [6]. Among
political historians see, for example, the work of Putnam[20].
not need loans, the most productive leave because they have much to gain and
the poorest and least productive leave because they have nothing to lose — they
cannot get a loan in either location.
A second result, which is implicit in the first, is that more people will move to
the modern sector when the interest rate is either very low (at low interest rates
the temptation to default is weak and therefore the advantage from being able
to monitor better is more limited) or very high (no one can afford to take out a
consumption loan).
Our third result says that the equilibrium rate of movement out of the tra-
ditional sector may be lower than the socially optimal rate (where social welfare
is measured by net social surplus).2 This is because as long as there are a lot of
people in the traditional sector, the economy-wide market for consumption loans
works well on average (because the quality of information is high for most of the
people). This allows the lenders to charge a higher rate of interest on these loans
than they would be able to charge if the market worked less well. But given that
the market rate of interest is high,3 a lot of people may be reluctant to leave the
traditional sector. Therefore this kind of a situation can be an equihbrium. Now
suppose that everyone in the traditional sector was forced to move to the modern
sector. Because of the lower quality of information, there will be fewer people
who are good credit risks from the point of view of the lenders. Competition
for these people will drive the interest down to the point where more and more
people will be able to get consumption loans even in the modern sector. Therefore
the number of people who, in equilibrium, get consumption loans may not shrink
(or shrink very much) while the number of people who are working in the more
productive sector goes up by a lot. Therefore the social surplus must be larger in
the new situation.
This 'inefficiency' result provides a formal statement of what it can mean for
modernization to be too slow. It reflects the general principle that in information
constrained economies, the market equilibrium may not be surplus maximizing.4
Now, in order to keep the model simple we have left out the important but well-
understood effects of congestion in the modern sector; these effects typically result
in the equilibrium rate of modernization being too high rather than too low. Thus,
the inefficiency result should be viewed less as a guide to policy and more as a
illustration of the general point that an institution that appears to work well (in
this instance, the system of lending in the traditional sector) may actually end up
2
 Williamson [28] surveys the evidence on whether the rate of migration to the modern sector
is optimal and argues that there is at the very least no clear evidence of over-migration.
3But not too high (see the discussion in the previous paragraph).
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 On the other hand, we have not established that the equilibrium is inefficient in the Pareto
sense — indeed, our conjecture is that it is constrained Pareto efficient.
hurting the people it appears to be helping (the people who stay in the traditional
sector in order to get the consumption loans) once one takes into account general
equilibrium effects.
We go on to try to characterize the set of economies where this kind of inef-
ficiently slow modernization is likely to emerge. We show is that it is less likely
both in very poor and very inegaiitarian economies and in very rich economies
than in the intermediate range of economies.
Turning next to dynamics, we observe that our model builds in a two-way
interaction between the process of growth and the process of institutional change.
On one side, the rate of growth in this economy depends on how many people take
advantage of the new technology and is therefore constrained by the institutional
difference between the traditional sector and the modern sector. Conversely, the
long run survival of the traditional institutions depends on the rate of growth.
This is because the price of loans (i.e. the rate of interest) depends on the supply
of capital: as the economy grows, capital becomes abundant and the price of
loans in both sectors falls. Since falling interest rates reduce agency costs in
the modern sector, the comparative advantage of the traditional sector in the
provision of loans is diminished, and people are further encouraged to emigrate
to the modern sector.
The dynamics of our model are in principle quite complex, and we provide
only a partial characterization. Nonetheless, we are able to provide conditions
under which the economy fully modernizes in the sense that the traditional sec-
tor vanishes. We can also show that full modernization is not inevitable — an
economy can partially modernize and then stop.
We also look at the income distribution implications of the process of mod-
ernization. Forty years ago, Kuznets [16] concluded on the basis of a study of the
process of modernization in a number of then-developed countries that the initial
impact of modernization was to increase inequality but that over time, inequality
would decrease as the economy approached full modernization. This prediction
for the pattern of evolution of inequality is what is known as the Kuznets inverted
U-hypothesis and has been the subject of many empirical studies and much con-
troversy in the development literature (e.g. [1], [11], [12], [28]). The favored
explanation (there have been others, e.g. [2], [7]) for why such a pattern should
emerge seems to be based on the shifting of the population from a low wage sector
to a high wage one (see e.g. [3]); thus a model such as ours is the natural place to
give the inverted-U hypothesis its best shot and ask whether it does indeed have
robust theoretical foundations.
We show that these underpinnings are anything but robust. In one case the
predictions of our model correspond exactly to the Kuznets hypothesis. But this
result is very sensitive to assumptions about self-selection in the decision to move
to the modern sector. By altering these assumptions in seemingly inconsequential
ways, we are able to generate a range of patterns for the evolution of the income
distribution, including one in which inequality decreases, then increases during the
course of modernization, in effect turning Kuznets on his head. This finding might
explain why some countries seem to follow the Kuznets pattern, while others do
not.
Our results are clearly driven by the specific assumptions we make. The basic
premise that the traditional sector as a relatively low level of information asymme-
try (so for instance provides surprisingly good insurance) is supported by studies
of consumption smoothing ([25], [26]). A number of recent papers have also ar-
gued that the remarkable success of certain traditional sector institutions (such
as Grameen banks in Bangladesh and the 19th century German credit coopera-
tives) derive from the high quality of information that people in the traditional
sector have about each other ([24], [27], [4]). There is also a lot of evidence that
idiosyncratic risks are very important, at least in traditional agriculture.5 The
relative anonymity of life in the modern sector is all too familiar to require proof.
Finally the one survey of people's motives for remaining in traditional sector that
we are aware of ([9]), finds that access to informal security mechanisms such as
consumption loans is the main reason why people do not move.
Our analysis is devoted to understanding the effects of interactions of different
institutional structures in a developing country. Naturally, our assumptions are
strong: for instance, the idea that once one starts working in the modern sector
one is completely cut off from the traditional sector, is an exaggeration of how
things really work. A number of studies have stressed the fact that one remains
closely connected to the family or even the extended family, long after one has
physically moved to the modern sector. At the same time, however, there is
also evidence of conflict and moral hazard between those who have moved and
those who remain.6 A variant of our assumption that would therefore be closer
to the truth is that one retains imperfect access to the security mechanisms of
the traditional sector for some time after one has moved. We believe that our
5
 See Townsend [25] to get some sense of the size of the risks faced by villagers in semi-arid
parts of India.
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 Stark [23] using data from Botswana has argued that the fact that remittances from urban
immigrants to their families based in rural areas rises with the migrant's income is evidence for
a coopertaive outcome within the family. However, the same result would also obtain if there
was moral hazard within the family which was only partly mitigated by the repeated-game
considerations that Stark has empahasized. Williamson [28], surveying studies of remittances
from migrants to their families, suggests that there is some evidence which supports high default
rates among migrants and concludes that the amount of control the family has over those who
migrated is an open empirical question.
qualitative results are robust to this kind of change in assumptions.'
Our work follows on a tradition in development economics of studying modern-
ization which goes back to the work Arthur Lewis [17]. Our two-sector economy
is a dual economy in the sense of Lewis and the question we ask about the de-
terminants of the rate of modernization and whether the rate of modernization is
optimal, are very much the questions Lewis asked in his classic paper more than 40
years ago. Our work departs from the work of Lewis and others in this tradition8,
in not assuming a difference in the nature of economic rationality between the
two sectors.9 Our agents are equally rational wherever they are — the differences
between the two sectors are technological and informational.
Finally, a remark about interpretation — we model the actual act of moving to
the modern sector as an act of migration from the rural sector to the urban sector.
The words, rural and traditional, urban and modern and migration and modern-
ization will be used interchangeably in the paper. This is done partly to give a
specific content to the idea of modernization and partly because migration is one
very important channel through which modernization takes place. Nevertheless
we want to emphasize that this is only one interpretation of the model; nothing
in the model requires that the move from the traditional sector to the modern
sector should involve physical displacement. Indeed, as has often been noted, in
some developing countries, migrants to cities often reproduce the social networks
formerly located in their villages. But membership in a network is costly, and
full engagement in the modern sector typically requires participation in different
networks or in a high degree of mobility (the latter is often cited as a source of the
modern sector's higher productivity) which makes the maintenance of close social
ties impossible. The point is that the patterns of income and inequality generated
by our model may be valid even if they do not manifest themselves in the patterns
of migration: everyone might move from village to city, but the economy will still
be slow to modernize.
7
 As they are to the observation that migration can provide a degree of insurance against
village-level aggregate risk by diversifying the family's income. This benefit of migration works
in essentially the same way as the productivity boost, and in any case does not gainsay the fact
that migration has costs in the form of lost idiosyncratic insurance.
8
 See for example Fei and Ranis [10], Harris and Todaro [14] and Sen[22].
9Lewis, for example, assumed that members of a family farm are always paid their average
product as long as they remain on the farm but are not paid once they leave. This is obviously
not the optimal contract for the family farm since it discourages people from leaving even though
they would be more productive elsewhere. There is now substantial evidence that the family
farm does act as an economically rational unit when it takes migration decisions, which puts
into question this assumption.[8]
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2. The Model
In this section and the next, we consider a one period model. There are just two
locations — a village representing the traditional sector and a city representing
the modern one. The economy has a single perfectly storable consumption good
and a continuum of agents. A typical individual begins life with an initial wealth
a. He makes a location choice which has no direct cost — labor is freely mobile.
In his youth, before entering his productive phase, an individual has a chance
to consume an indivisible good which yields utility s and costs m units of the
good (to fix ideas we will think of this good as a form of schooling that does not
affect future wages. It could equally be medicine or a wedding - it just should
not be an investment that affects future incomes)10. If his wealth is insufficient
to finance schooling, he may attempt to borrow the difference. In adulthood, the
individual earns his income from labor, which he supplies inelastically, and repays
any loan obligations. The von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences have the form
y -\- u, (so the agent is risk-neutral in net income y), where u denotes the utility
from schooling, which is either s if m is consumed, or 0 if it is not.
The first crucial assumption is that productivity is higher in the city than in
the village. We model this by assuming that an individual who can earn w in
his village could earn \w in the city, where A > 1. In a first-best world, where
information was not at issue, everyone could borrow and lend at the market gross
interest rate r (the only reason to borrow would be to finance school). Thus every
individual would move to the city, enjoy a utility of Xw 4- s + (a — ra)r, and the
economy would operate efficiently.
But this is not a first-best world, and this fact affects the workings of the
market for consumption loans. We assume that capital is freely mobile between
the two locations and that there is free entry of lenders in both locations. What is
not mobile is information and enforcement powers. The consumption loan market
is distinguished by the possibility that a borrower might renege on a debt. Suppose
an agent has wealth a; he borrows m — a. As part of the lending agreement, he
promises to keep the lender abreast of his whereabouts. Should the borrower
attempt to flee the agreed upon location before he has earned his income, the
lender can detect him with probability p. If detected, the borrower is punished
maximally by having his consumption held to zero;11 if he escapes (presumably
to the city), he will be able to consume his entire gross income. After earning his
10
 We can actually allow it to be an investment but the result is a much more messy model.
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 We assume that the lender commits to this punishment policy, which strikes us as plausible
in this context. We could instead let the lender and borrower renegotiate at this stage; this
would have the effect of reducing the efficiency of the loan market in each sector, but not the
relative efficiency between the sectors. Thus it would complicate the notation but not change
the conclusions very much.
income, it comes time to repay the loan, and he may again attempt to avoid his
obligations by fleeing from the purview of the lender. At this stage, the borrower
succeeds in escaping attempts at recovering the loan with probability TT; with
probability 1 — TT he is caught before he has a chance to dispose of his income and
again a maximal punishment is imposed which holds his consumption to zero.
This situation leads lenders to require that loan contracts satisfy incentive
compatibility constraints ex-post, that is after income is earned, and ex-ante, that
is when borrowers could renege on the location agreement. Suppose that if the
borrower earns y (= w or Xw depending on where he locates) he is to repay P(y)
and that the income to be earned is known at the time of contracting; then ex-post
incentive compatibility requires y — P(y) > iry for each y. Competition among
lenders will ensure that P(y) = {m — a)r; hence ex-post incentive compatibility
entails y — (m — a)r > Try or a > ap = m — ^1~7r'y.
Since the contract will satisfy this condition, the borrower knows that if he
tries to flee before earning his income, he can get at most the expected payoff
of pXw, whereas if he remains where he agreed, he gets w — (ra — a)r (in the
village) or Xw — (m — a)r (in the city). Thus there is also an ex-ante incentive
constraint that a > a\ = m — "~^A)W (if he agreed to stay in the village) or
a > acA = m — ^~P)Xw (m the city). All loans made in equilibrium will satisfy
these constraints, and the borrower will never renege.12
Since an agent who agrees to work in location I = V,C needs exactly ra to pay
for youthful consumption, his initial wealth must satisfy a> ai = max{ap,alA} if
he is to borrow at all; if his wealth is below this threshold value, he will be unable
to pay for the consumption. Observe that this threshold value of wealth ai is
increasing in the interest rate, decreasing in income, and increasing in the escape
probabilities ?r and p; this simple, if perhaps extreme, model of an imperfect loan
market accords in its conclusions with those of other agency models.
We now use this model to distinguish the informational advantage of the vil-
lage over the city. Specifically, we make the extreme assumption that escape
is impossible if one is born and remains in the village; any attempt to escape
either ex-ante or ex-post would immediately be detected by the local network
or village moneylender. Hence, p = ?r = 0 there, and the threshold wealth is
m — w/r = av(w, r): as long as the individual's wage in the village exceeds rar,
she can borrow and go to school. If instead she locates in the city at any time in
her life (either by choice or by birth), TT is large in the sense that A(l — TT) < 1;
thus, ac(w,r) = m — (1 — ir)Xw/r > av(w,r) for all w and r. We also assume
12If we assume that the income level is not realized until ex-post, then the ex-post constraint
is replaced by a set of constraints of the same form; competition implies EP(y) = (m — a)r and
the ex-ante constraint becomes a > dp = m — ' - 7 r ^, where y = Ey. The ex-ante constraints
assume the same form, with w replaced by w.
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that p = 7T for loans originating in the city, but p = 0 for loans originating in the
village.13
This market imperfection is the source of the possibility of undermigration: an
individual whose wealth lies between the threshold values ac(w, r) and av(w, r)
would indeed gain a higher wage by migrating, but would be giving up the pos-
sibility of consuming during youth. (Note that it is never socially or individually
optimal for someone born in the city to move to the country, because he faces
the same value of n but earns a lower income.) It remains to be shown that this
possibility is compatible with competitive equilibrium.
3. Static Equilibrium
Normalize the population of adults in the world in any period to be of Lebesgue
measure 1. Denote by R(a) the measure of people born in the village with wealth
less than a at the beginning of the period. Denote by U(a) the corresponding
measure in the city.
Let us now consider the choice problem faced by the those born in the rural
sector. Given an interest rate r, an agent with a > ac(w,r) has a payoff of
w — mr 4- ar if he stays in the village and \w — mr + ar if he moves to the
city, so he clearly will migrate. If his wealth is less than av(w,r), he will also
migrate because he doesn't get a loan in either location and so takes the higher
urban wage. An agent with wealth between ac(w, r) and av{w, r) however, will
s (A — 1 )w
migrate only if w — mr + ar < Xw — s + ar, i.e. if r > = f(w).
m m
What this tells us is that migration will tend to be carried out by the relatively
wealthy and by those for whom the market interest rate exceeds r(w); since this
is a decreasing function of w, it is those with the highest incomes (e.g. the most
skilled) who will migrate. Finally, very poor low-skilled people may also migrate
— this requires that their skill levels are low enough to make av(w, r) positive;
if not, even agents with zero wealth will be able to borrow for school and will
remain in the village.
To summarize, we have
Proposition 3.1. An agent born in the village with wealth a and who earns w
there migrates to the city when the interest rate is r only if (a) a > ac(w, r) or
(b) r > f(w) or (c) a < ay(w, r).
13
 Thus if one borrows from a village moneylender but agrees to locate in the city, one faces
exactly the same constraint that one would face if one simply moved to the city and borrowed
there.
As we have already noted, those who grew up in the urban sector never have
reason to migrate to the village. See Figure 1 (w(r) is the inverse of f(w), i.e. the
income level at which an agent is indifferent between staying in the village with
a loan and moving to the city without it).
Given this proposition, the supply and demand for loans can be characterized
very simply. For the remainder of this section we assume that everyone earns the
same income, so that agents only differ in initial wealth; thus we might as well
write ac(f) and av(r) for ac(w, r) and ay(w, r) evaluated at this common value of
w, and f for f(w). All of those with wealth above ac(r) demand loans, as do those
with wealth less than ac{r) who remain in the village. If the interest rate is greater
than r, everyone migrates, so the demand for loans is ra[l — R(a,c(r)) — C/(ac(r))],
s s
which is decreasing (at r = —, the demand is the interval [0, rafl — R(ac(—)) —
m m
U(ac(—))]]). At r, those villagers with wealth below ac(r) but above av(r)
f ft
are indifferent between the two locations, so the demand becomes an interval
[ra[l - R(ac(f)) - U{ac(f))],m[l - R(av(r)) - U(ac(f))]]; as r declines further
demand becomes m[l — R(ay(r)) — U(ac(r))], eventually reaching its maximum
value of m. Supply is simply the aggregate wealth a. Thus equilibrium, if it
exists, is generically unique.14 It is straightforward to check that the maximum
equilibrium gross interest rate is s/ra, while because the good is storable, the
miiiimum is 1.
Figure 2 illustrates the situation. Also shown are the demand functions which
would result in the first-best case without information problems (this is also the
demand function for a pure village economy in which there was no urban sector
to migrate to), and the demand from a pure urban economy (say one in which
everyone was forced to move to the city).
We can now check whether the equilibrium level of migration is efficient in
the sense of making full use of the existing supply of resources. In particular
we shall ask whether social surplus could be increased relative to its equilibrium
level by forcing agents to choose locations in some way other than the one which
occurs in equilibrium.15 Thus we shall not be concerned here with the possibility
of increases in social surplus which might be obtained from interventions in the
loan market or from tax and transfer schemes more generally. We should also
note at this point that, as is often the case in economies in which incentives and
14Existence is guaranteed if R(-) and U(-) are continuous. With such distribution functions,
the only case of nonuniqueness occurs in the nongeneric case in which o = m, in which case we
focus on the equilibrium where r = 1, which is the one that maximizes the level of migration
and social surplus.
15
 Surplus here is defined here as total output plus the net value of all youthful consumption
— thus the maximum surplus an economy with mean wage w and mean wealth a can generate
is Xw + a(s(m — 1).
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wealth effects play a role, the potential surplus increases under discussion cannot
typically be transformed into Pareto improvements.
On the face of it, we should expect that any situation where some agents
remain in the rural sector is a candidate for inefficiency. To see this, note that
labor in the rural sector is being used inefficiently. If a small number of people
were moved to the urban sector, more income would be generated. This reduces
the demand for loans however, but if the interest rate is able to fall, the wealth
that is no longer being used in the rural sector can flow to the city, clearing the
market at a lower interest rate, as shown in Figure 2.16
The next step is to determine whether and under what conditions an inefficient
equilibrium actually exists. Figure 3 illustrates the level of migration as a function
of the equilibrium interest rate. Clearly a necessary condition for inefficiency is
that the equilibrium r be no higher than r. Since 1 is the lowest equilibrium value
of r, inefficient undermigration requires that
(« - m) > (A - l)w. (3.1)
The necessity of this condition is clear: if the productivity differential between
village and city is large (A is large), then the attraction of the city is enough to
swamp the possible lack of school, and everyone migrates. By the same token, if
the value of the loans is small (s is close to ra), undermigration is unlikely, since
poor people have little to lose by leaving their village.
As is evident from Figure 2, the existence of inefficient undermigration de-
pends in part on the mean level of wealth. But it also it depends on the higher
moments of the wealth distribution. A complete characterization for continuous
distributions of wealth is offered in the following
Proposition 3.2. Suppose condition (3.1) holds and R(-) and U{-) are contin-
uous. Then the level of migration is inefficient if and only if (a) 1 — R(av(l)) —
U(oc(l)) >-and(b)->[l- R(oc(r)) - U(ac(f))}.m m
Proof. First, suppose that conditions (a) and (b) hold. Condition (a) ensures
that the equilibrium interest rate r* is greater than one, while Condition (b)
implies that at least some agents remain in the rural sector. There are now two
cases. If — < 1 — R(ac(l)) — f/(ac(l)), then moving all people to the urban
m
sector raises output (because they are more productive) without changing the
surplus from youthful consumption, because the loan market will now clear at a
I6This does not say that the optimal allocation has everyone moving to the urban sector, since
if the interest rate cannot fall enough, some of the wealth would be consumed rather than being
used for school. This will be clarified below.
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new interest rate lower than r*. Thus, surplus increases, and the original level
of migration was inefficient. If instead — > 1 — R(ac(l)) — U(ac(l)), one can
m
increase surplus by requiring [1 — R(ac(l)) — U(ac{l))] agents with wealth
m
less than ac(l) (this quantity is less than R(ac(l)) — R(ay(l)) by Condition (a))
to stay in the village and sending everyone else to the city; this clears the loan
market at r = 1 and increases output by increasing the number of people in the
city.
Conversely, suppose that (a) fails to hold, i.e. that r* = 1. Then moving
anyone from the village to the city increases output, but they will now be unable
to get a loan since the interest rate cannot fall (their wealth must be less than
ac (1) or they already would have moved); by (3.1) this entails a net loss of surplus.
If (b) fails, then as we have seen, everyone migrates, so equilibrium is efficient. •
This proposition is the central result of this section. It helps to shed light on
exactly what the rural institution is doing. Clearly, since in the initial equilibrium
there are people who choose to remain in the traditional sector, they are paying less
in interest in the traditional sector than they would in the modern sector (more
precisely, they are getting loans there that they would not get in the modern
sector). In other words, the rural credit institution does facilitate borrowing. On
the other hand if they were moved to the modern sector the wealth they were using
would not lay fallow: somebody would end up using it in the more productive
modern sector. The interest rate would fall to make this possible; in other words
the rural credit institution creates inefficiency by allowing the interest rate to be
set too high relative to its second-best level.
One special case deserves to be underscored. If the economy is wealthy in the
sense that a > m, migration is always efficient (condition (a) is violated in this
case). Since, as we have said, poor economies will tend to have efficient migration
as well (although this is not necessary), it is the middling economies, where the
villagers have something to lose but wealth is not yet so plentiful as to render
the urban agency problems nugatory, that are the best candidates for inefficient
undermigration.
Observe that the falling interest rate which results from a policy of forced
migration will hurt net lenders (which may include very poor agents as well as
the very wealthy); the beneficiaries would tend to be those at the middling wealth
levels. But as we suggested before, it appears unlikely that there are taxes and
transfers can turn the surplus increase into a Pareto improvement.
We summarize this section by noting that if the urban sector is suddenly
opened to a very poor economy, there should be full migration (the interest rate
is likely to be higher than r). Only if the rural economy has a sufficiently high
aggregate wealth is undermigration likely to be a problem. The degree of un-
12
dermigration will depend not only on the aggregate level of wealth but also on
its distribution. For instance, if the distribution is fairly inegalitarian while the
mean is reasonably high, R(ac(r)) is likely to be large, so that it is quite easy
for undermigration to occur. The general point to note is that distribution of
wealth in the two sectors is the state variable which tells us, among other things,
how many people migrate. Thus if we can generate an account of the dynamics
of the wealth distribution, we will also have generated the rate of migration and
modernization endogenously.
4. Some Rudimentary Dynamics
There are two things we hope to accomplish by studying a dynamic version of this
model. First, we want to check whether the undermigration that we have identified
as a possibility in the short run is actually a possibility when the distribution of
wealth (which affects both demand and the supply side of the loan market) is
endogenous, and more generally whether there is a possibility that this could be a
long run phenomenon: is there a undermigration trap? Second, having developed
a two sector model of a developing economy in which the rate of migration is
endogenous (as are the "adjustment costs"), we can re-examine some traditional
questions about the relationship between modernization and income distribution
in a setting which is comparable to the ones in which they were originally asked:
specifically, does the "sectoral shifting" account of modernization provide robust
foundation for the famous Kuznets inverted U?
We consider these issues by starting with a purely rural economy and examin-
ing the level of migration and the distribution of labor earnings over time after the
urban sector is opened. A full analysis of the global dynamics of the model seems
to be intractable,17 and in any case is beyond the scope of this paper, so we limit
ourselves to a few special cases which nevertheless illustrate how the migration
dynamics can lead to a variety of patterns of the evolution of inequality.
In order to study the dynamics in the simplest possible way, we need to elabo-
rate a bit on the timing and preferences used in the previous sections. We restore
the assumption that there is a multitude of skill levels w; we shall make alterna-
tive assumptions about whether these are known at the time migration decisions
17
 Ours is one of a class of dynamic income distribution models characterized by a nonlinear
recursive map on the space of wealth distributions. Because there appear to be no general results
on such dynamics, most analysts have proceeded by reducing the dimension of the problem,
either by studying certain parametric special cases (e.g. [5]) or by restricting attention to families
of distributions (e.g. lognormal) which are closed under the individual (loglinear) transition
rules (e.g. [13]). We shall follow a combination of these two tacks: somewhat paradoxically, by
complicating the model slightly, we are able to simplify the analysis considerably, reducing the
problem to a single dimension.
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are made. The economy lasts an infinite number of periods and the population
is stationary. In every period an individual receives his initial wealth in the form
of a bequest from his parent. Adult consumption and earnings occur twice, at
dates 1 and 2 within the period. The utility is of the form u + C\ + c2~ bP, where
u is the indicator of youthful consumption, Q is adult consumption at date i,
and b is the bequest. Location choice, borrowing and youthful consumption occur
before date 1; uncertainty (if any) about skill level is resolved at date 1, and the
wage earned at date 2 is the same as that earned at date 1. The agent's date 1
consumption occurs after repaying any loans (below we shall make assumptions
to guarantee that repayments can be made out of a single date's earnings). If the
agent earns y at each date, his indirect utility is u + (1 4- S)y + ^(a — m)r , where
6 = 13^(1 — /?)1-/3 < 1. Finally, assume that agents who are caught after reneging
on loans are subject only to having their date-1 income confiscated; date-2 income
is inappropriable.18
Notice that with these preferences, the marginal utility of a dollar at date 1 ex-
ceeds that at date 2. This introduces the possible need for a second consumption-
loan market, distinct from the school loan market: agents have an incentive to
borrow against date 2 earnings in order to consume at the first date. Equilibrium
in this consumption-loan market would entail that the gross interest rate there be
equal to 1/6. One equilibrium allocation — the one we shall focus on exclusively
— has each agent consuming date-1 earnings net of loan repayments at date 1,
and splitting date-2 earnings between date-2 consumption and the bequest; in
particular, no one is actually borrowing or lending between dates. This is the
unique symmetric equilibrium and the only one that would be compatible with
even a slight imperfection in the consumption loan market.
Under these assumptions, the bequest, which is identical to the offspring's
initial wealth, is equal to /3y, provided that y is large enough to cover any loan
repayments. This specification of preferences, earnings levels and the consump-
tion loan market yields exactly the same one-period behavior that we saw in the
previous sections. Moreover, it greatly simplifies the analysis of the dynamics; in
particular, the information contained in the distribution of wealth in each location
is summarized by the single number R denoting the fraction of the population in
the rural sector. Since our purpose is to illustrate the variety of possible dynamic
behavior generated by migration (as distinct from wealth accumulation, which
has been studied by many authors), rather than to make strong predictions, we
feel justified in imposing this structure.
Finally, for what follows we need to distinguish between two alternative as-
18If one assumes instead that lifetime income can be held to zero, the expressions for ac{r)
and av(r) become ra — (1 + £)(1 — ir)Xw/r and TO — (1 + 8)w/r ; this is nearly inconsequential
for the analysis but requires some cumbersome modification of notation.
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sumptions about when an agent's skill becomes known (to himself and the public
alike). In one case, this information is not learned until date 1; in the second it
is known at birth. It turns out that this small change in timing assumptions can
have a dramatic effect on the pattern of evolution of inequality.
4.1. Full Modernization and the Kuznets curve
Suppose first that agents learn their skill level after choosing a location (to be
precise, at date 1), so that their decisions correspond to the one-wage case con-
sidered in Section 3. Let the distribution of skills (corresponding to village labor
earnings) be F(w), which is supported on a nondegenerate interval [«z,Wj with
density f(w), mean iD, and variance a2. The distribution of earnings among
those in the city is then F(j).
In order to guarantee that agents repay loans out of date-1 earnings alone,
we need to assume that m. > s ( s is the largest possible value of rar, since r <
s/m.) Notice that this implies that the fraction of villagers born with wealth less
than a>v(r) is always zero ( the largest value of a^(-) is m — JT^ < m — jr^ <
m — JJ^ — 0): villagers can always insure. We are only interested in the case in
which average wealth a is less than ra, since in the other case modernization is
instantaneous. Thus we assume that /? is small enough that (3w < m.
For ease of computation, we use the coefficient of variation as an inequality
measure. Suppose that in period t the population of the rural sector at the
beginning of the period (i.e. before the location decisions) is i^; then the urban
population is 1 — Rt. This will serve as the state variable; we don't need to
consider any higher dimensional objects such as the wealth distribution: since an
agent whose income realization is w and who remains in the village in period t — 1
bequeaths /3w to his child, the fraction of the rural population at the beginning of
period t with wealth less than x is given by F ( | ) ; thus the rural wealth distribution
is just RtF(^), while the urban distribution is (1 — Rt)F(-^g).
The distribution of wages in the economy in period t is then given by Rt+iF(w)+
(1 — Rt+i)F(^) (by our notational convention, Rt+i is the rural population after
people choose their locations and so represents the relevant population for com-
puting the distribution of incomes). One can readily check that inequality is equal
to J when R = 0 or 1, is increasing at 0, decreasing at 1, and has a (unique) max-
imum at R = ^ j ,19 Since mean income Rw 4- (1 — R)Xw is decreasing in i?, if we
19
 These properties can be established using the expression for the coefficient of variation,
which is
I[R + (1-R)\2](<T2+W2) ~
V [R+(1-R)\]2w2
where R G [0,1].
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can show that (a) Rt decreases monotonically; (b) the economy fully modernizes
(that is, Rt converges to 0); and (c) it does so in more that one period (otherwise
inequality remains at ^= for all time); we will have shown that the economy follows
the inverted-U curve as it develops.20
We note first that the level of migration (i.e. Rt — Rt+i), as shown in Figure
3, is nonnegative — no one ever migrates from the city to the village. Thus Rt
does indeed follow a monotonic path.
>From Figure 3, a lower bound for the level of migration is given by R(oo) —
R(ac(f)) = Rt(l-F(^P)). Thus, if W > ^ ^ , there is a uniform positive lower
bound on the fraction of the rural population that will migrate each period, and
it follows that Rt converges to zero.
Finally, we need to ensure that the economy does not modernize instantly.
Note (again refer to Figure 3) that if the interest rate is r upon opening the urban
sector, then not everyone migrates in the first period, except in the singular case
in which m[l — R(ac(f))] = (3w. This is equivalent to the condition that ^ >
1 - F(^P).21 Thus we have
Proposition 4.1. IfW > ^ , ^ > s, and ^ > 1 - F(SBj&)i then ast-+oc,
Rt —• 0 (the economy fully modernizes) and the path of inequality and income
follows an inverted-U curve.
Notice that although the economy fully modernizes, it does so too slowly
— even if full modernization takes only finite time,22 any discounted sum of
single-period social surpluses would be increased if modernization were to occur
immediately as the modern sector opens.
The modernization process in this example operates at two levels. When
full modernization occurs, it is because some fraction of rural agents are always
successful enough to pass on a large bequest to their children, who can then
afford to insure themselves in the modern sector. This is an individual level effect
20Apparently, the idea that a monotonic increase in the urban population leads to this
inverted-U relation between income and the coefficient of variation is known (see [11]), although
there the rate of migration is left unexplained.
21
 It is not hard to find distributions which satisfy this condition. Start with a mean wage w
> qs and the unit mass there. Choose (3 small enough to render ac^ > w. Now replace the unit
mass with a uniform with mean w and support in [qs, a c i r ' ] . Through mean-preserving spreads,
generate a continuous distribution G(w) with support equal to [qs, ac]f']. Since G(ac\r)) = l5
^ > 1 — G{ac£<). Finally, let F be a mean-preserving spread of G which puts (a small) positive
weight above a c i r ' , preserving the condition.
22For some parameter values, mean wealth might exceed m in finite time, which as we have
seen, then leads immediately to full modernization.
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which depends on primitive assumptions about the distribution of earnings. But
there is also a 'trickle-down" effect which operates at a more aggregate level:
as people move to the city, they earn more so that aggregate wealth increases;
meanwhile, demand for loans typically does not increase. This leads to a decrease
in the interest rate, which relaxes the borrowing constraints for everyone. More
generally, the agency costs of borrowing in the city are reduced at the lowered
interest rate (in this case reflected by the fall in ac(r)), which in turn make the
modern sector attractive to more people. A related trickle-down mechanism is
discussed in [2]
In a parallel way, increasing wealth in the modern sector reduces the effects
of poor information there. For an individual, having a lot of wealth improves his
borrowing prospects. And as the whole economy becomes wealthy, falling interest
rates lower the agency costs of borrowing for everybody. Thus, there is a dual
sense in which a wealthy economy can afford to do without good information.
4.2. Undermigration in the Long Run
What if the conditions of Proposition 4.1 are not satisfied? Is it possible that a
long-run version of undermigration can occur, i.e. that the economy could settle
into a steady state in which some people inefficiently remain in the rural sector?
If the economy were to get stuck in an undermigration trap, both the indi-
vidual and trickle-down effects would have to be mitigated. We first begin by
dispensing with the assumption that w > a<^r ', which weakens the first effect,
and is necessary if there is not to be full modernization; thus w < ^jp- and
F(fj) — 1- We continue to assume that (3w < m, as this is also a necessary
condition for undermigration, as discussed above.
We shall be interested in deriving the recursion function for the state variable
Rt, the rural population at the beginning of the period t. Denoting the current
interest rate by rt, the rural population evolves according to:
Rt+1=G(Rt) = l &[Rt + (i-Rt)X\-(1-Rt)(i-F(Xtel))i n = f (4.1)
0, rt>r
Of course, this is not yet a proper characterization of dynamics, because rt itself
depends on Rt through the loan market equilibrium. This equilibrium can be
characterized very simply, however. The supply of loans each period is /3w[Rt +
(1 — Rt)X\. Demand is
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>From these expressions, one can verify that r is increasing in R when rt < r.
Now observe that for all R E [0,1], G(R) < R, since migration never goes from
city to village. Since G(R) > 0 by definition, we conclude that G(0) = 0.
We now need to establish the existence of the fixed points of (•?(•) other than
zero. At any such be such a fixed point, the associated interest rate r* must satisfy
F(a°0 ') = 1 and r* < f. Suppose there is a fixed point (call it R ) associated
with the interest rate r. As this is a stationary point, there can be no migration
when R = R. Therefore, supply must be equated to the highest level of demand
generated by f (refer back to Figures 2 and 3) and we have
- R)\] = m[l - (1 - R)F(~p-)}- (4-2)
Now choose R* below R. The corresponding equilibrium interest rate r* must also
lie below r (supply increases while demand decreases). So long as F(a°^ ') =
1, R* is also a fixed point of G(-). Indeed, there will be an interval (possibly
degenerate) of fixed points [R, R], where the interest rate r associated with R
satisfies CLC{L) — fiw- Thus we need only establish the existence of a nonzero
solution to (4.2) in order to guarantee that G(-) has stationary points bounded
away from zero.23
Solving (4.2) for R yields
A/3 /
this expression lies in the allowable range if and only if j^-p + F(Ssjjp-) — 1 > 0. It
is not hard to find parameter values for which this condition holds. Thus we have
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that ^ + F(^p-) - 1 > 0. Then there exists an
interval [R, R] of rural population levels which remain constant over time once
the economy arrives there.
23For R> R, the interest rate remains at f. Raising R decreases supply and raises the upper
bound of demand at f, so the interest rate cannot fall. On the other hand, if r rises, it must
satisfy
qm(l -
solutions to this equation are decreasing in R, a contradiction.
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Since R > 0, at least some of these levels are positive: full modernization does
not occur. We therefore refer to the interval [R, R] as the "undermigration trap."
How might the economy actually arrive in an undermigration trap? We could
start by returning to our original question and asking whether long-run undermi-
gration is possible starting from a pure rural economy. Figure 4 illustrates possible
shapes that G(R) might assume, given that the undermigration trap exists. As
noted in footnote 23 above, when R> R, the interest rate is f. Thus, G(R) is linear
there and can have either slope, depending on the sign of ^ ( 1 — A) +1 — F(^gp).
If the slope is positive (Figure 4(a)), then an economy starting at R = 1 will
converge to R; income inequality will increase over time, perhaps decreasing a
small amount toward the end (the so-called inverted J-curve).
But for most parameter values the slope will be negative (see Figure 4(b)).
Thus the only way a pure rural economy would fall into the undermigration trap
is if (7(1) = ^—- > R : as shown in Figure 4(b), when this condition is satisfied,
the economy jumps to the undermigration trap as soon as the urban sector opens.
If this condition fails, the economy jumps past the undermigration trap when the
urban sector opens and then eventually fully modernizes (Figure 4(c)). In these
cases, trickle-down remains strong enough to eventually modernize the economy.
We have been asking whether long run undermigration is possible assuming
that the economy starts out purely rural. This is a useful thought experiment,
but is not necessarily the only relevant case. Many instances of modernization
and development, especially in modern times, correspond to opening an already
large urban sector to the rural sector. Thus initial conditions with R < 1 are also
of interest. As indicated in Figure 4(c), the basin of attraction of the undermi-
gration trap is considerably larger than the trap itself, so a failure to modernize
is reasonably likely: if the economy begins with the size of the rural sector in the
interval [R, R], it falls into the trap. We therefore have a dynamic analogue to
the conditions leading to undermigration in the static case discussed in the pre-
vious section. Opening a moderate-sized city to the village may not effect further
development of the economy, at least if one relies on the laissez-faire migration
mechanism.
4.3. Other Dynamics with Self-Selection
As we stated at the outset, there has been considerable controversy surrounding
the validity of the Kuznets hypothesis. We have seen that it is possible for the
migratory dynamics generated by the trade-off between high modern sector pro-
ductivity and efficient traditional sector institutions to yield an inverted-U curve.
What we show now, is that even if we maintain the same basic "engine" of mod-
ernization that Kuznets and his followers described, it is possible under plausible
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specifications to generate rather different patterns for the evolution of inequality.
In particular, the way individuals select for migration will be crucial.
Suppose that agents learn the level of their earnings at birth, before they make
their location decision. Assume this information is public. Then each period,
migration follows the pattern described by Proposition 3.1 and Figure 1. In
particular, note that low-skill agents migrate while medium-skill agents remain in
the rural sector. Imagine that the low-skilled in the city actually end up earning
close to what the medium-skilled are earning back in the village. Then, assuming
the fraction of very high-skill agents (those who migrate even though they could
get loans in the rural sector) is small, the possibility arises that opening the urban
sector could actually decrease the level of inequality; subsequently, as the rural
sector empties out, inequality increases again. The result is an "upright" U, rather
than Kuznets's inverted U. In the appendix, we analyze a specific example which
generates this and other patterns of the evolution of inequality.
The implications of the dynamic examples in this section may be summarized
by saying that the characteristics of those who choose to migrate may have impor-
tant implications for the evolution of inequality in developing countries. Moreover,
as the example there shows, the dynamics of inequality can depend delicately on
the parameters of the distribution of these characteristics. In addition, as a com-
parison with the results Sections 4.1 and 4.2 reveals, seemingly irrelevant changes
in the timing of location decisions can have a dramatic impact on the evolution
of the aggregate variables. We conclude that there is no broad theoretical reason
— even if we adhere to a sectoral shifting story of development — to believe in
the universality of the inverted U.
5. Discussion
The model in this paper, while suggestive in several respects, leaves out much
to be a useful predictive model of the process of modernization. Some of these
omitted factors, such as congestion effects in the modern sector and the fact that
one does not get completely cut off from the traditional sector when one first
starts working in the modern sector, go against our results. Others, like the fact
that the ability of the traditional sector to provide better loans or insurance may
depend on how many people are left in the traditional sector, may reinforce our
results. A truly predictive model of the process of modernization must build in
all of these effects.
20
5.1. Overmigration?
One possibility which we have not so far discussed is that of overmigration, ac-
cording to many a major problem in many countries today. In the present model,
overmigration exists when the aggregate wealth a is less than m, but the loan
market fails to clear, i.e. even at an interest rate of unity there is more wealth
than is demanded for youthful consumption. Now, while this won't be possible
under laissez-faire (if r = 1, anyone who moved to the city who doesn't have a
loan there would be better off staying in his village; the wealth would flow to
him there, and condition (3.1) implies he would be better off), it is possible that
catastrophes such as the Bengal famine in the 1940's would have the effect of
forcing sudden movement to the city with concomitant dissolution of the rural
information networks. Suppose that the condition — > 1 — R(ac(l)) — U(ac(l))
m
mentioned in the proof of Proposition 3.2 holds. Then we would have a situation
in which everyone (say) was in the city, but a fair amount of them (more than is
necessary given the amount of wealth in the economy) were unable to borrow so
that much of the economy's wealth would be ''idle," i.e., consumed rather than
used for school. Thus, while forced migration might have desirable consequences
if there are not too many villagers who are poor (have wealth less than ac(l)),
the opposite may be true if there are too many of them; an optimum would then
involve keeping some of those people in the rural sector.24
5.2. Alternate Assumptions about Capital Flows
A different sort of possibility arises when we drop the assumption that wealth is
free to flow between the village and the city. It has frequently been argued that
capital formation in developing countries is inhibited by its inability to flow across
sectors. Policies have often been designed to try to encourage intersectoral mobil-
ity of resources. Without going into details on the effects of closing the "national"
capital market on the level of migration (it could be higher or lower, depending
on parameters, but as in the case we have been considering, will generally not
result in instantaneous full modernization), we will focus on what it says about
the nature of the inefficiency in our model.
Supposing then that wealth cannot freely flow between sectors, the principal
effect is that the argument for static inefficiency no longer applies: while forcing
everyone into the modern sector would continue to result in increased output, the
capital would no longer follow them to the city. Thus, under laissez-faire, the
24
 The optimal allocations of people across sectors are the those used in the proof of Propo-
sition 2. Of course, this discussion presupposes that interventions in the loan market or direct
redistributions of wealth are not possible.
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rate of modernization, although not instantaneous (individuals face a trade-off
between high productivity and credit availability), could not be considered to be
inefficient in the sense we have been considering: only if capital were somehow
forced into the modern sector along with the individuals could a surplus gain be
achieved.
To see this explicitly, take the extreme case in which the capital is stuck in
each location at whatever amounts are there initially. In equilibrium there will
be two interest rates, one for each location. Call them 7V and re (we cannot say
which is higher, in general). All villagers with wealth below av{rv) and above
ac{rc) wiU migrate. Forcing those who remain to move to the city will not affect
the urban interest rate (since demand falls in the village, the interest rate would
fall there, but this doesn't help anyone because everyone who had been there
before was getting a loan) because no capital can flow there and the new arrivals
don't have an effective demand because their wealth lies below ac(rc) - The new
arrivals must be worse off (since they had chosen not to move in the equilibrium
and their options in the city are no different), so total surplus must decline.
This situation parallels the one in which life in the village has some consump-
tion value that is unavailable in the city (scenery, for instance). In this standard
hedonic pricing setting, agents locate in one sector or the other depending on
their tastes for scenery; the resulting allocation is efficient. Thus, it is the ability
of wealth to flow between the sectors that generates the static inefficiency in our
model.25
But there is a difference between the case of wealth and that of scenery:26 next
period's capital can effectively be brought to the city, while next period's scenery
cannot. Once everyone is forced into the urban sector, they will generate more
wealth for the ensuing period than they would have under laissez faire. Since
capital market clearing within the urban sector entails that all of this wealth be
used for loans, surplus will be higher in the second period than it would be without
forced migration. Therefore, when wealth cannot flow across the two sectors,'the
static economy is efficient, but the dynamic economy may remain inefficient.
5.3. Implications for Rural Lending Institutions
At first blush, our results might suggest that policies designed to encourage the
availability of credit in the traditional sector may be misguided. Certainly, arbi-
trary ones designed simply to ease the flows of capital between rural and urban
25
 This is not t o say t h a t t he laissez-faire surplus generated when capital can flow is smaller
than it is when capital cannot (again, it can go either way). But in t h e former case, it is not as
large as it could be , given t he constraints on information and resource flow, while in t he second
case, it is.
26
 Beside t he one t h a t t he capital market is imperfect within t he two locations.
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moneylenders might serve to retard rate of modernization. But what the forgoing
discussion on capital flows (and the analysis more generally) should make clear is
that the effects of changes in the quality of the rural institution depend critically
on how economy wide cost of capital is affected. Policies designed to ease access
to credit in the rural sector should be implemented bearing in mind what the
social opportunity cost of capital is, and more particularly in conjunction with
policies designed to elicit greater availability of capital, e.g. saving subsidies or
foreign aid.
To see this somewhat more precisely, imagine that the village begins with a
(small) positive value of TT and that a policy is introduced which has the effect
of lowering it, say to 0. Imagine at the same time that there is no change in
aggregate wealth (nothing is done either to elicit more saving within the economy
or to obtain capital from abroad). The initial impact is that ay falls, so fewer
people will migrate to the city: the 'bottom" of the middle class remaining in the
village expands.. Since this typically results in a greater demand for loans, the
interest rate will rise, which raises ac\ this means that the "top" of the middle
class expands as well (of course, the rising interest rate causes ay to rise again,
but it is easy to show that it cannot rise above its old level).27 The net effect is
a decrease in migration and a slowdown in the rate of modernization.
Notice this argument depends crucially on the interest-rate increasing effect
of the rural lending program. This can be mitigated in several ways. In practice,
programs such as Grameen bank tend to rely on foreign aid and other sources
of funding that come from outside the economy and which therefore are unlikely
to affect the capital market within the country very much: if the capital were
not funneled to poor women, it probably would not go to more productive uses
in Bangladesh. Indeed, the success of these programs in attracting capital from
abroad is at least as important as their ability to channel that wealth to tar-
geted groups. (Observe that if we trace the effects of the decrease in TT without a
concomitant rise in the interest rate, the effects are unambiguously welfare enhanc-
ing: the people who are now getting loans are better off—they could still migrate
without a loan if they chose—while absent the pecuniary externality generated by
2rTo see this, denote by ay if) the village threshold wealth with the lower value of TT; note
that av{f) < a>v{r) for each r. Let the old interest rate be VQ and the new one r\. The new
market clearing equation which determines r± is
l-U(ac(r1))-R(dv(r1)) = --
m
therefore r\ > ro (as long as U{-) and R{-) are strictly increasing). Thus U(ac{ri)) > U(ac{ro)),
from which it follows, using the market clearing equations, that R(av(ri)) < R(av{ro))- Note
this implies that the new level of migration, R(oo) — [R(ac(ri)) — R{av(ri))] is lower than the
old one.
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changes in r, there is no effect on anyone else.) Alternatively, if the interest elas-
ticity of saving is high, the effects we have outlined will also be mitigated. More
generally, policies which encourage savings will be most effective when it can be
ensured that the capital thus generated will actually reach potential borrowers.
A similar point pertains to the evaluation of programs designed to promote
rural industry. If loans in our model were for production rather than consumption,
the effects would be similar: there could be too much production in the rural
sector, and modernization could too slow. A rural industry which is growing
rapidly may not be a socially desirable target for investment: high growth might
reflect credit availability (because of local information networks) rather than high
social returns.
The point is that just as we should not be trying to understand the institutions
of an economy in isolation from one another, we cannot think sensibly about
policies in isolation from one another: programs designed to channel credit to
targeted groups must be accompanied by programs designed to raise this credit
from low cost sources, lest they do more harm than good. Poor countries don't
need only to get wealth to poor people; they also need more wealth.
6. Appendix: Violations of the Inverted U
Suppose that there are just two skill levels, w and Xw (these are the earnings of
an agent in the village; in the city he would earn Xw and X2w). An agent's chance
of having the high skill is x, assumed independent of the wealth he inherits. Make
the following parametric assumptions:
(A + p)w > s - (A - l)Xw (6.1)
(s - m) > (A - l)Xw (6.2)
Xwm . .
Pw>m 6.3
s — (A — l)Xw
m — w > X/3w (6-4)
Assumption (6.1) ensures that high-skill agents in the rural sector can repay loans
at date 1 when the interest rate is f (Aiu); (6.2) is the analog of (3.1) and ensures
that inefficient undermigration is possible; (6.3) implies that the high-skill agents
always have enough wealth to obtain a loan (i.e., their wealth, which is at least /3w,
exceeds ay(Xw, f)), while (6.4) ensures that the low-skill agents are below av(w, 1)
and therefore always migrate.28 Figure 5, which is just Figure 1 specialized to the
28It is not difficult to find parameters satisfying (6.1)-(6.4). For instance, A = 2, w = 1,
q = 0.5, m = 3, s = 8, /3 = 0.2.
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current example, depicts the possible wealth-wage combinations that can occur
as the economy evolves. Before the modern sector opens, wages are either w or
Xw, and wealth always lies somewhere below (3Xw (so wealth-wage pairs lie on
the heavy segments) .2& Note that by choosing 7TC sufficiently close to 1, one can
guarantee that the high-skill agents born in the village will be unable to obtain
loans in the city (i.e., their wealth will lie below ac{Xw, r) for all r).
Assumption (6.4) ensures that as long as some of the population remains in the
rural sector, a positive fraction x °f their children will be born poor and low-skilled
enough to migrate. Eventually, therefore, the economy fully modernizes. Observe
that in this example, in contrast to those considered in the previous subsections,
it is the low types who migrate; modernization comes from below rather than
above (more generally, as we have pointed out, it tends to come from the tails of
the distribution, not the middle).
In any period, only two wages are earned: either w and Xw or Xw and A w.
Thus, if p is the fraction of the population earning the higher wage, the coefficient
of variation is y'p
 A~^ _ , which achieves a unique maximum at p = j ^ . The
initial distribution of wages has x a* ^w SLn^ 1 - X at w; since there is full
modernization, eventually the distribution approaches x a^ ^w ai1^ 1 ~~ X a^ ^w-
Thus, inequality is the same at the start and end of the development process.
Now consider the periods in between. As the urban sector opens, the low-skill
agents migrate to the city, where they earn Ait;. They pass on bequests of (3Xw;
their children will earn either Aw; or X2w, bequeathing /3Xw and (3X2w. Meanwhile,
the children of the high-skilled agents who remain in the village inherit wealth
j3Xw and skill w or Xw. From these considerations, there are five possible wealth-
wage pairs that can occur once the modern sector is opened (but before location
choices are made); these are denoted by the X's in Figure 5.
For certain levels of x,30 market clearing entails that r = f(Xw) and that some
(call the fraction r) of the high-skill agents also migrate (the demand and supply
functions for this case are shown in Figure 6).31 Suppose that x = TTT (or nearly
29
 Without actually calculating any particular distribution of wealth —such as a steady state
— for the pure rural economy (unlike in sections 4.1 and 4.2, this computation is complicated by
the fact that under the parametric assumptions (6.1)-(6.4), at interest rates larger than r(Aiu),
loans cannot necessarily be repaid out of date-3 earnings alone ), it is not hard to verify that
an upper bound for any agent's wealth is /3\w, since from what we said at the beginning of the
section, Xw is the most that an agent would have at date 4 from which to produce a bequest.
30Specifically, maximum demand at r(\w), X(¥mi must exceed supply [xA + 1 — x]Pwi using
(6.4), this is equivalent to
31
 The figure is drawn supposing that there are just two wealth levels at the time the city opens;
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so); after the urban sector opens we have XJ at A w and 1 — xj a^ ^w- Since
X = JTI yields the maximum level of inequality , we find that in this case that
the initial impact of the development process is to decrease inequality.
As before, let Rt denote the beginning-of-period-< rural population. As t in-
creases, Rt decreases monotonically to zero; the supply of wealth is therefore
increasing. Demand, meanwhile, cannot increase above its maximum initial level
%ra, since only high-skill agents (whether rural or urban) can exceed the respec-
tive threshold wealth levels. Therefore, interest rates cannot increase over time. If
the interest rate in some period t is less than f(Xw), the fraction of the population
earning the high wage is %(1 — i^), which increases with time. With x ~ A+I>
this implies that inequality must increase over time as well.32 In the limit as the
economy evolves toward full modernization, inequality returns to its initial level:
the path of inequality follows an upright U, contrary to Kuznets's hypothesis.
Essentially the same conclusion holds if initially market clearing occurs at
r = 1 (i.e., when x isais to satisfy condition (6.5)), in which case none of the
high-skill migrate in the first period. Then everyone earns Xw: there is perfect
equality (p = 0) as soon as the modern sector opens. Then a similar argument
gives us a monotonic increase of p back to its initial level. Inequality then traces
out an upright U, at least if X{3 < I.33
For other values of %, however, the initial impact of opening the modern sector
can lead to an increase in inequality, a la Kuznets. To take an extreme example,
suppose that % is nearly equal to 1 (so there is nearly perfect equality to begin
with). Then the interest rate following the opening of the modern sector will be
f(Xw). A large fraction of the rural population migrates and earns the high wage
X2w: inequality has increased.34 Eventually, of course, everyone will end up in the
city, so inequality will have to decline to its original level, yielding the inverted U.
the key point is that a finite number is typical. Readers may be bothered by the discontinuity
in the demand which results from the atoms in the wage distribution. If instead the distribution
was atomless and supported on two small intervals centered about w and Xw, then demand
would be continuous and the interest rates would always assume values very close to f, r\, and
T2 depicted in the diagram. The present example can be thought of as an approximation to
that case. (Of course, by (6.4) T\ and r2 are less than 1, so equilibrium always exists in the first
period after the city opens; but the approximation is valid more generally.)
32
 In case r remains at f{Xw), the fraction of high wage earners is still increasing over time,
but the argument is slightly more complicated, and we omit it.
33If not, then if x > xfcf' meoiuatity will overshoot its final (and original) level before declining
back to it, thereby following a "sleeping S."
34
 With x close to 1, the fraction of the population which migrates and receives X2w upon the
opening of the modern sector is close to 1 — A ^ ; using (6.4), this exceeds y4j- Noting that
inequality is decreasing on [JTJ »1] proves the claim.
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